Protests and Coercive Capacity of the State

Protests and Coercive Capacity of the State

Economics

Ruilang Qin

2023

This project investigates two questions: how does a regime’s coercive capacity influence its response to protest movements, and do dissidents consider this information before deciding whether to protest? In the model, a dissident receives a noisy signal about a regime’s coercive capacity, before deciding whether to organise a protest. The regime observes the dissident’s action and chooses a level of repression subject to its state capacity. Suppressing a protest is costly, and the effectiveness of suppression also depends on the relative strength of the dissident. While a successful protest is rewarding for the dissident, orchestrating a failed one may incur harsh punishment. We find that the regime’s dominant strategy is to always fully suppress any protest, regardless of its type. In equilibrium, the dissident protests if he believes the regime is weaker than his capacity to protest